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ABSTRACT

This paper proposes a comprehensive model in which the emergence and growth of various professions in Sweden can be localized and better understood. An opening section offers some remarks about the problem of definition and delineation of the concept of "profession." This section defines professionals as carriers of abstract expert systems, enabling them to perform acts that are perceived as valuable (skilled, informative, helpful, profitable) and trustworthy by clients. The paper locates the professions in the wider context of class and stratification and then gradually narrows down the perspective by focussing on the specifics of Swedish professions as a special case of continental professional development. This section notes that in contrast to the "Anglo-American" countries, most of the professions of continental Europe have had the state as both educator, protector and main employer. This section also identifies four historical "take-offs" for specific kinds of professionals: (1) civil servants and state administrators, (2) engineers, (3) social service professionals, and (4) political professionals. The take-offs are linked to changes in one crucial determinant: variations in governmental forms and state policies. The result suggests that in continental social formations, the demand and needs of the state are a major precondition for professional evolution. (Contains 85 reference notes.) (JB)

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EXPERT SOCIETY

The Origins and Development of Professions in Sweden

by

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As we all know, modern social development can be understood in a variety of ways. Here I would like to apply a perspective emphasizing that we live in a society increasingly guided and permeated by expert knowledge. "Already Talcott Parsons" claimed that it is not capitalism, free enterprise, or socialism that constitutes the most salient feature of modern society, but the "professional complex" - the rapid expansion of a broad stratum of professional occupations, i.e. carriers of expertise. In this respect, during our century the U.S. and the Soviet Union as well as other industrialized countries have displayed similar characteristics.

Today it is often said that experts govern our lives from the cradle to the grave, offering rules and advice about how we should behave and how we should be treated. As a contemporary American follower of Parsons begins his book about experts: "The professions dominate our world. They heal our bodies, measure our profits, save our souls".[1] On a micro-level we have family therapists, psychoanalysts, tax lawyers, physicians, teachers, social workers. On a macro level there are social planners, economists, bureaucrats, politicians, technicians, scientific experts. While the former occupations carry out personal services to clients in face-to face relations, the latter are mandated to regulate and develop the frameworks of social interaction. Common to the groups is that they base their authority on special knowledge and/or skills. Claims to superior knowledge in combination with a general social recognition and trust of the same has generated relatively high social rewards in terms of income and status. During our century, expert knowledge has been more or less identical to scientifically based and justified knowledge.

The evolution of expert strata have impelled many social scientists to talk about qualitative changes in the history of social development. Contemporary society is now frequently called "knowledge society", "information society", "post-industrial society", and the like; labels seeking to mark a structural break with the epoch of classic industrialism. Today, people are comparatively more preoccupied with information and service, and to a lesser extent with the primary and secondary sectors, i.e. the production of traditional goods. In these societies, professionals assume key positions.

Although professions have been present for a long time, "professional society", i.e. a society where relations of dominance and subordination are legitimized by formal credentials and meritocratic principles, represents an historical epoch sharply distinct from classical industrialism's emphasis on property as the fundamental principle of differentiation and stratification. Scholars like Alvin Gouldner even talk about the existence of a *New Class*, comprised by intellectuals and professionals, primarily emerging from the expansion of higher education initiated during the 60s.[2]

The members of this relatively heterogeneous class share a command of "rational discourse", a mode of speech based on a socio-technical language. In some respects they are "amoral", rejecting traditional values in favor of a rational, scientifically based management and steering of social development. We find good examples of the predominance of professional discourse in contemporary public debates; today these are more of less monopolized by factions belonging to the professional class, especially politicians, intellectuals, journalists and science-based expertise. Public disputes may concern inflation or unemployment or nuclear power or the environment; experts

representing private business or welfare society or narrower interests act as problem discoverers and opinion makers. In order to better understand the dynamics of public debates, we must thus first understand the social conditions, identities and aspirations of these strategic groups.

In recent years, several scholars have complained that the area of professional studies has reached an impasse. For instance, Eliot Freidson laments that "there has not been any significant advance in developing a theory of professions over the past decade or so", since theoretical discussions have "either addressed false issues or issues which are essentially insoluble because of the very nature of the concept of profession itself."[3] The situation of the 1980s is depicted by Dietrich Rueschmeyer as in "turmoil",[4] and by Robert Dingwall as on the road to an inevitable "turning point", since established traditions have reached some kind of limit.[5] In a similar vein, Gerald Geison states that "There is good reason to suspect that all of the existing models of professions and professionalization are inadequate to some degree and in some respects."[6]

To many scholars, the solution lies in the application of a broader perspective on the object of study. Celia Davies holds that the conventional perspectives "play down and sometimes totally obscure the material and ideological conditions for different kinds of work organization, and that the phenomenon of study /professions/ therefore must be located...in the wider social structure."[7] Dingwall maintains that "Professional work must be studied not just in the context of a division of labor but as part of a network of social and economic relations."[8] Discussing the proposal that professions must be analyzed by being related to political power, Rueschemeyer argues that such an extension is still not sufficient: we must go even further, exploring "the conditions of this power".[9]

These recommendations seem to imply that we must relate studies of professions to extant, general sociological theory. (The alternative would be to create an entirely new social theory, which might be a bit too ambitious.) Only if professions "lived their own lives", so to speak, i.e. if they were completely autonomous, following their own laws of development, would it be justified to study them *per se*, without connecting them to general social development.

In the following I will adhere to these recommendations. After some necessary remarks about the interminable problem of definition and delineation, I will locate the professions in the wider context of class and stratification, and then gradually narrow down the perspective by focussing upon the specifics of Swedish professions as a special case of Continental professional development.[10] My purpose is to propose a blueprint, or elements of a more comprehensive model, in which the emergence and growth of various professions can be localized and better understood. Although below, I apply the model on Swedish material only, the idea is that after modifications, the model would be applicable to other countries as well.

The Concept of Profession

On the one hand we cannot avoid delineating the object of study, on the other hand, as the endless attempts to define "profession" indicate, it is easy to reach an impasse right here. It is difficult to find the *differentia specifica* of professions, their internally shared and externally distinguishing characteristics. Indeed, most definitional attempts still fall back upon Talcott Parson's codification (if sometimes only to reject it). Parsons emphasized 1) formal technical training, 2) demonstrable skills in the pragmatic

application of this training, and 3) institutional mechanisms to ensure that this competence is used in a socially responsible way. This conceptualization has subsequently been fleshed out in numerous ways in terms of ethical codes, occupational integrity, service for the common good, professional associations, an esoteric, common language, gate-keeping, specific mechanisms of reproduction, and more.[11] In contrast to the benevolent, apolitical and homogeneous portrait of professions offered by the Parsonian tradition, which may be called the "naive" approach due to its tendency to take professionals' self-image at face value, during the 60s a "cynical"alternative, emphasizing the conspiratorial and exploitative nature of professions has evolved. As I have argued elsewhere, both the naive and the cynical approaches are severely hampered by ideological overtones.[12]

Contemporary scholars, well aware of the definitional problem, largely tend to disregard the traditional emphasis on allegedly altruistic, self-interested, or other "traits" in order to focus upon more basic dimensions. However, the emphasis is still on the connection between professions and *formal* training, especially university education. The reason is that university education results in formal credentials, often constituting an unconditional ticket of entry to professional life. Obviously, this idea also goes back to Parsons. Parsons considered science the profession *par excellence*: the sciences are surrounded by a ring of other professions "charged with applying knowledge to social order (law), health (medicine), effectiveness in governmental and private collectives (administration), efficient use of the nonsocial environment (technology), and so on.[13] For the same reason, Harold Perkin calls university teachers the "key profession", the profession from which all other professions emanate.[14] Thus, the relation between science and the professions is viewed approximately like the relation between basic and applied research; a linear model stretching from production of knowledge (science), over distribution (university teaching) to application (professional practice). Professionals of various sorts act as intermediaries between scientists and laymen, applying the knowledge of the former to the benefit of the latter. Professional practice is legitimized by the scientific origins of its knowledge and skills. (Thus, while scientists provide the cognitive justification of professional practice, professionals provide the social justification of scientific practice.)

A second main point of attention in modern conceptualizations is the comparatively high status and prestige of professions. Combining these two points we obtain the common sociologistic definition: academically based *and* high status.

A definition of this kind is advocated by e.g. Eliot Freidson, deploying two criteria: a) some degree of exposure to higher education, and b) employment in particular positions.[15] Magali Sarfatti Larson suggests a similar definition: professions are "links between relatively high levels of formal education and relatively desirable positions and/or rewards in the social divisions of labor."[16]

Such definitions may have been plausible previously, but their validity tend to diminish with the decrease of the university as society's prime guarantor of knowledge. First, since the university curriculum has come to embrace virtually every form of vocational training (especially in the U. S. but also in Sweden), the link between universities and "true" professions has become opaque. Second, previously, established professions like medicine and law did not require university training. Third, there are modern professional careers that do not require formal university training, which will be exemplified later. Thus I do not think university training or formal education should be emphasized too much; although most professional socialization and training is nowadays

transmitted through the university, this is a historically contingent fact, a specific historical form.[17] Fourth, since most definitions tend to define professions on a social level only, it becomes arduous to understand why some types of academic knowledge systems generate high social rewards while others do not. What is the particular power of professional knowledge? In order to come to grips with such questions, it seems necessary to supplement sociological definitions with a more precise notion of exactly what a profession has to offer, that is, to include the nature of its knowledge base.

Consequently, Rolf Torstendahl's simple definition is a more useful starting point. After a discussion of merits and disadvantages of various "strategic" and "essential property" definitions, Torstendahl concludes that the definitional base must be "knowledge-based groups". These are defined as "groups that may develop professionalism". Thus, professions are indirectly defined as a subset of knowledge-based groups. According to Torstendahl this is the appropriate way of avoiding the difficulty that Anglo-American and Continental countries have dissimilar conditions for the development of professions: "The only remaining part ...which is not definable only in terms of English language use, is knowledge."[18] Knowledge is crucial to the definition, be it to argue its functional or status-enhancing capacity.

On a cognitive level, what is specific to professions is the *abstracting power* of their knowledge systems. Because of their high levels of abstraction, professional systems of knowledge are capable of seizing and incorporating new problems into their domains of competence. Moreover, abstraction enables the creation of new problem areas. As Andrew Abbot has argued, what distinguishes professions from e.g. auto mechanics is precisely the former's abstracting ability: "If auto mechanics had that kind of abstraction, if they 'contained' the relevant sections of what is presently the engineering profession, and had considered taking all repair of internal combustion engines on abstract grounds, they would, for my purposes, be a profession."[19] At the same time, it may be added, the level of abstraction must not be too high, compare for instance the position of philosophy today. Optimally abstract systems facilitates the enlargement of domains of competence and the inclusion of new problems in a plausible and trustworthy manner.

The focus upon abstract knowledge is also helpful for understanding stratification *within* a profession. Higher posts in a professional hierarchy tend to be associated with a command of higher levels of abstraction, covering a larger portion of the territory in question.

However, this formal perspective does not seem to suffice. Somewhat reluctantly, I think we have to include a substantial aspect on knowledge in order to account for differences in status and prestige between professions, i.e. to consider the *subject* and *content* of various knowledge systems. Professions dealing with *matters of ultimate cultural concern* seem to enjoy higher status than others. Animals are not deemed as important as human beings, thus physicians rank higher than veterinarians. Indeed, the contemporary cultural focus on health, life and death helps to explain the elevated status of medicine, just as professions like the clergy, experts on transcendental meaning, or military officers, protecting the population from enemies, due to the high cultural values placed on these issues were the most prestigious professions of previous times.

This consideration carries over to the ideological or subjective counterpart to cognitive abstractions. Professional status is related to the general cultural assessment and *perception* of professions. In turn, this feature is linked to another typical attribute of many professions; the amount of *uncertainty* (today: *risk*) involved in professional activity. As Terence Johnson and others have argued, there is an optimal balance

between indetermination and technicality that can be expressed as an I/T ratio. If the ratio is too high, too much uncertainty is involved, and the profession in question will be perceived as found wanting in performance and will not be able to accumulate sufficient trust. If the ratio is too low, i.e. the activity is mechanic and can readily be codified and communicated in the form of rules, it can also easily be overtaken by other occupations or be performed by laymen. At the right balance between technicality and risk the professional is perceived as a "hero" possessing an inestimable power to subjugate what is threatening to her/his clients.

The key concept here is *trust*. Successful professions enjoy strong general confidence based upon a general perception of the significance and difficulties of their activities. Here, we find the appropriate place for inserting professional attributes. Relations of trust are backed up and sustained by most professions' zealous emphasis on a strict occupational integrity, ethical codes, and other disciplinary mechanisms, and by their stress on collegiality and professional equality.

Trust is vital to a profession, constituting the cement binding professionals to their clients or with the wider society. Therefore, as Inga Hellberg argues, "profession" is a relational concept.[20] In modern society, trust is confided not so much in the individual practitioner as in the knowledge system as such. And as Anthony Giddens has pointed out, one major characteristic of modernity is precisely the replacement of trust in tradition and face-to-face relations by trust in abstract expert systems, the representatives, or "access points", of which are the professionals.[21]

The collective strategy of highlighting the skills of the vocation and colleagues as such, not distinguishing between single practitioners, represents a feature already denoted by Durkheim's concept of *exchangeability*. In principle, any certified practitioner should be capable of competent performance within the field in question. Hence tendencies to specialization and fragmentation resulting from increased division of labor is counterbalanced by mechanical solidarity, based upon the notion of exchangeability between colleagues.

Now "clients" or "the public", i.e. groups relying upon, supporting, employing, buying or trusting professional activity, may be of unequal importance. Contingent upon more general power relations in society at large, the crucial trust-holding power may be laymen or the electorate, but it may also be state authorities, private corporations, voluntary organizations, individuals, or other professional groups, which we will return to. To professionals, all employers are clients. Thus, "clients" in the definition I hereby propose can take several social forms:

Professions are carriersof abstract expert systems, enabling them to perform acts that are perceived as valuable (skilled, informative, helpful, profitable) and trustworthy by clients.

This structural or synchronic definition should be supplemented with a diachronic dimension, i.e. the typical strategy of professionalization, which is to seek discretion, exclusionary closure, or occupational monopoly, in order to reduce competition and maintain scarcity concerning the capacity in question.

Profession and Class

In this section an attempt is made to encircle the stratum of professions by applying some general parameters and numbers. It should be stressed that official statistics is not constructed to fit scholarly endeavors. Occupational statistics in general, and figures on

the professions in particular, are often defective for research purposes, both on national and international, comparative levels.[22] Thus the following account should not be seen as an attempt to a straightforward operationalization of the theoretical definition of profession proposed above.

Professions and the Middle Class

Professions are generally identified as belonging to the middle classes, more specifically to the educated upper-middle class. According to most accounts, the most salient feature of our century is the enormous expansion of strata between the two traditional classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. For instance, between 1930 and 1975 the Swedish middle class has risen from 12% of the labor force in 1930 to 38% in 1975. (Discounting "proletarianized middle strata", i.e. occupations in the middle classes that are clearly of working class nature, the figures are 10 and 29 percent respectively.)[23] In this respect the profiles of Sweden and e.g. the U.S. are similar[24].

In most Marxist accounts the middle class is negatively defined as the class between the main antagonistic classes of capital and labor. Thus it is most often delineated in terms of its relations to the other classes, especially by function, position and ideology. Let me add a fourth: cultural distinction.

The *function* of the middle class is primarily conceived as associated with the survival of capitalist society at large. Great parts of the middle strata perform reproducing, administrative, transferring, legitimizing and repressive tasks, i.e. they carry out mediating labor essential to the maintenance of capital. The higher parts of the middle layers - "the professional-managerial class" - is of special importance in this respect, inventing and implementing increasingly sophisticated instruments for the rationalization of labor and the reproduction, supervising and control of the working class, inside as well as outside the work-place.[25]

Secondly, the middle class is defined by its *position* between the major classes. Belonging to the middle class implies being positioned in "contradictory class locations". Such positions may imply being neither exploiter or exploited, e.g. self-employed entrepreneurs (the old or traditional petty bourgeoisie), or being both, which is characteristic of the new middle class. The latter group, to which the majority of professionals belong, are exploited because of their lack of capital assets but are simultaneously "skill-exploiters" of the lower classes; they are "specific functionaries" of capital and the state.[26] (Moreover they tend to exploit the margins of capitalist markets by establishing minor practices, companies and consultant firms, purchasing stocks, property, capital, and the like).

Thirdly, the middle class at large and professions in particular are carriers of a specific social *ideology*. From an ideal typical point of view, while the bourgeoisie maintained an entrepreneurial ideology emphasizing property and the market as basic principles of distribution and stratification and active capital as the engine of the economy, the rival ideology of the working class stressed labor and cooperation as the dynamic elements of society, and equality as the primary distributive principle. By contrast, the social ideology of the professional middle class underscores individual achievement in terms of skill and trained expertise as major principles of distribution and stratification. We might say that while the ideology of the bourgeoisie is based on economic capital and the ideology of the working class is based on political capital, the ideology of the middle classes is based on the notion of human capital, measurable in

knowledge and skills. Thus professional ideology is *meritocratic*. Opposing the two others, it simultaneously constitutes the predominant ideology of modern society.

Fourthly, the middle class is characterized by its specific cultural or educational capital. As Pierre Bourdieu (who must be regarded as close to neo-marxism) has demonstrated, the members of the middle class in general and the professions in particular exhibit a specific taste for higher or "legitimate" works of art, music, film, food, wine and so forth that separates them from other classes, or in other words, they possess a "sense of distinction" that they seldom fail to emphasize.[27]

Most neo-marxist accounts distinguish between three productive resources: property or physical capital, skills, and organization. Professional experts are possessors of the two latter. While top bureaucrats, political experts, managers, and others are organizational experts, physicians, lawyers and the like have skill assets, or assets in formal credentials, achieved through education. Both groups appropriate parts of the surplus product; while skill experts make claims on the surplus through the "monopoly" rent component of expert wages, organizational experts make claims on the basis of "loyalty rents" built into managerial wages, which are designed to secure managers' commitment to their employing organization.[28] This delineation of experts can be seen as a basic framework for placing the foregoing definition of "professional" within a broader socio-economic context.

Professions and the Service Class

Focussing upon market relations and changes in occupational structure, mainstream sociology views social development as the gradual transformation from agrarian and industrial goods-producing to a service economy. In its broadest sense, "service" is defined negatively, comprising all labor that do not result in tangible material goods, including government (i.e. all that is not agriculture, mining, quarrying, manufacturing, construction, utilities):

Percentage of labor force in service[29]

	1960	- - -	1977	1980	1985	1989
Sweden	41	- - -	58	62	63	67
France	39	- - -	49	57	61	64
Germany	38	- - -	47	50	54	56
Canada	52	- - -	64	66	69	70
U.K.	48	- - -	55	60	66	68
U.S.	57	- - -	64	66	69	70

Canada and the United States has advanced farthest on the road to a service economy. The most striking characteristic of the overall trend is, however, the profound similarity and parallel development of these countries (parenthetically lending support to the thesis of the emergence of post-industrial society, irrespective of predominant political system).

The growth of the professional stratum is understood as a part of general occupational change, producing a rapidly expanding *service class*. In Weberian sociology, classes are defined on the basis of position on the market, life-chances and life-styles. Individuals possessing approximately the same income, life-chances and patterns of

mobility are categorized as one class. According to Karl Renner's original conception of a *Dienstklasse*, the service class involves employees in public service (civil servants and other officials), in private economic service (business administrators, managers, technical experts, etc), and in social services. John Goldthorpe's division of society into eleven classes is an elaboration of Renner. The service class is comprised by the Goldthorpian classes I and II. Class I involves Higher-grade professionals, administrators, and officials; managers in large establishments; large proprietors, while class II includes Lower-grade professionals, administrators, and officials; higher-grade technicians; managers in small business and industrial establishments; supervisors and nonmanual employees.[30] These classes number between 25 and 30 percent of the labor force in most industrially advanced countries.

In most accounts, the service class is described in terms of its connections with "knowledge, education and science". Its incumbents exercise authority; enjoy well-defined careers and high levels of trust and discretion; entry to such places are regulated by the differential possession of credentials, serving as the main demarcation between the service class and "deskilled white-collar workers".[31]

Professions as Public and Private Hierarchies

In addition to class perspectives, recent sociological theory - under the banner "Bring the state back in!" - has discerned a supplementary perspective, also focussing upon differences and contradictions albeit not primarily between classes but between sectors.[32] As is well-known, parallel to the growth of middle classes/service classes, the most profound occupational transformation in our century has been the expansion of the public sector. Sweden is unique in this respect. Between 1951 and 1980, the rate of change in public employment in percent of the workforce was 5.0 in Britain, 15.2 in France, 11.4 in Germany, 13.0 in Italy, 1.3 in the U.S., and as much as 23.0 in Sweden.[33]

From this vantage point, the essential social tension goes between the private and the public and their subsectors, i.e. industrial branches, governmental authorities and service agencies. The sectors form vertical hierarchies exhibiting pyramid-like structures. The top is occupied by elites and higher professions, followed by a broader layer of semi-professional occupations, and at the foot of the pyramid we find vast groups of assisting lower workers in service and industry.

The notion of an essential tension between public and private sectors has recently been elaborated by the British social historian Harold Perkin. Indeed, Perkin argues that while the main cleavage in feudal society went between lords and peasants, and in industrial society between capitalists and wage-earners, the most important division in modern society is between public and private professional interests. Perkin contends that "the doctors, the civil servants, the military, the social workers and administrators, the university and government scientific researchers are all manifestly in competition for public resources. The managers of private corporations are primarily concerned to limit those resources by keeping taxation down." ..."Consequently, by far the most important division between the interest groups is between the public sector professions, those funded directly or indirectly by the state, and the private sector professions."[34] Moreover, according to Perkin this tension is fatal to the system; just like the internal contradictions of former social formations contained their own seeds of destruction, so

will the cleavage between private and public eventually lead to a major reconstitution of society.[35]

So the professions constitute a substantial component of a broader middle class, they are parts of an expanding service class, they are split into public and private sectors, and they reside at the upper half of vertical hierarchies. In order to get a grasp of what groups we will be dealing with below, let us draw a crude portrait of the contemporary professional class in Sweden. Combining the parameters of Goldthorpe and Perkin, we obtain the following figures.

The Swedish Professional Class, 1985[36]

	public	private	total	% of labor
prof-manag	203.000	180.000	385.000	9
semi-prof	351.000	313.000	667.000	16

In the professional-managerial group, 44% are women in the public sector and 18% in the private sector. In the semi-professional group, 69% are women in the public and 27% in the private sector. Clearly, female professionals obtain most of their jobs in the public sector.

Some of the most important professions have the following size:

Selected Professions, 1985[37]



[Since a nation-specific "professional profile" of the above type is related to more profound national patterns, a fruitful research task would be the comparison of dissimilarities in various professional profiles, for instance between countries belonging to Continental and Anglo-American types. To mention just one example: In contrast to Sweden, in the U.S. there are more lawyers than physicians. In the U.S. there are 7.3 private lawyers for each publicly employed lawyer (including judges), while in Sweden, there are 0.7 private lawyers for each publicly employed lawyer, including judges. How are contrasts of this kind to be accounted for? What are they telling us about the more general internal structures and dynamics, in this case especially the law systems, of the respective countries?]

After this rough outline of a few very broad sociological determinants and figures delineating the professional class, we now turn to more specific parameters crucial for the development of the Swedish professions.

The Historical Emergence of Professions in Sweden

There are of course a number of preconditions that must be present for the origin and growth of professional groups. One of the more decisive is technological development; most professions build their competence on precisely a command of scientific theory and technical instruments. Another crucial precondition is the existence - or prospects of creating - a market or an alternative demand for the competence in question, a third the establishment of educational institutions for the subject. In the following, I will limit the perspective to the origin or "take-off" of professional hierarchies in relation to changes in another crucial parameter; *the state*. In contrast to the Anglo-American countries, most professions of Continental Europe have had the state as both educator, protector (by university education and the law), and main employer.

It is common to identify the emergence of the Swedish state in its modern form with the period of Gustavus Vasa, i.e. the 16th century establishment of a national monarchy, a nationally comprehensive law system, a unitary currency, and an "absolutist" state. Gunnar Olofson views this period as a first broad "layer" in the development of the Swedish state formation. The second layer is the state's engagement in the construction of an infra-structure for communication and industry during the second half of the nineteenth century; what Torstendahl calls the phase of "classical industrial capitalism". The third layer involves the building of welfare; the increasing commitments of the state to guarantee a certain level of safety and standard of living to its citizens.[38]

Torstendahl labels the period between 1890 and 1935/45 organized capitalism; a period when a liberal economy is combined with a growing sphere of common or competing interests between industry and state, resulting in a liberal democratic interventionism organized through state bureaucracy. The next phase, participatory capitalism up to 1970, is characterized by a liberal economy combined with explicit goals of control, interventionism and a distributive welfare policy, resulting in a strong growth of the public sector and consumption. The fourth phase is corporatist capitalism, characterized by the growing together of political power, bureaucracy and interest organizations.[39]

These and other transformations in state policy and society correspond to demands on new kinds of expertise. In the following, I will attempt to show how changes in the

broader structures of state formation and state objectives entail the emergence of distinct "professional waves", and later also that once a profession has had its historical take-off it tends to stay, i.e. develop various kinds of reproductive mechanisms for the maintenance of the calling in question.

Professions and the Nation State.

In a broad sense the occurrence of professions can be traced very far back in time; the priesthood and military corps have always exhibited professional-resembling structures. The roles as monarch, emperor or prince have also conveyed professional attributes, like perhaps the knighthood; a certain collegiality and a strong code of honor have distinguished these socially responsible and richly rewarded posts. However, if we let abstract knowledge, competence and formal credentials be crucial criteria for professional status, it is more doubtful whether these older vocations should be included, since heritage and other concerns often regulated entry.

Ordinarily, medicine, law and religion (including university education) are counted as the classical pre-industrial professions. However, these products of the medieval university were not distinguished by superior practical knowledge skills, but rather belonged to the scholastic tradition. Hence they might be labelled *status professions*, as distinct from modern, science-based *occupational professions*.

The rise of modern professions in Continental Europe is the outcome of deliberate efforts of its states to develop effective state machineries. Thus it seems more appropriate to link the historical origins of professions to the reformed state constitutions, to the centralization into "absolutist states", of the 16th and 17th centuries. European reorganizations to nation states entailed that governmental powers encountered new and vast administrative tasks, requiring regulated bureaucracies managed by skilled personnel. Slowly, professionally trained civil servants challenged and gradually began to replace prelates and the military aristocracy. In France, the *noblesse de epée* was succeeded by the *noblesse de robe*, and in Sweden the governmental *Ämbetsmannen* made his entry on the historical scene.

The establishment of a bureaucratic apparatus was a precondition for the growth of state professions. During the 17th century, the Swedish central and local administration expanded considerably, externally as well as internally. Between 1650 and 1730, civil servants are estimated to have increased by 80 %. While external growth resulted from extended territorial borders, internal growth was a response to the needs of increasing control over the population for taxation purposes and for the recruitment of soldiers. Thus in both cases, the growth of bureaucracy was necessitated by Sweden's expensive war engagements. Indeed, the major portion of bureaucratic expansion between 1650 and 1730 is found in the financial organs, with an increase in personnel from 60 to 186 employed, or 210 %, and the military organs, especially the admiralty, experiencing an increase from 22 to 74 employed administrators, or 236 %.[40]

During the 16th century, Swedish civil servants were not yet separated from the King's court of personal servants and lackeys. As a response to the increasing difficulties in recruiting competent personnel, the governmental act of 1634 altered the situation, binding state services to formal requirements of qualification. The restoration of Uppsala university offered an important source of recruitment for these services. Due to the persistent ecclesiastical domination at the university, additional auscultant systems were introduced for the more effective, practical training of the "politicii" of state

management.[41] To the five High Chancellors were attached collegiate boards plus administrative bureaucracies of lower civil servants. Thus the state apparatus became rationalized, vertically by a regulated order of command, and horizontally by a specified division of labor.[42]

The development of a unitary administration was to a great extent enforced by the expansion of the military sector. During the 17th century, the Swedish armed forces concomitantly underwent rapid internal professionalization and bureaucratization, involving the establishment of well-defined roles and decision hierarchies, replacing the previous rather unclear orders of command. Increasingly, the corps of officers included university trained, scholarly commoners.[43]

State bureaucrats of the 18th century needed formal education and a diploma for serving government in the courts, mining, taxation and general administration. During the 19th century, most collegiate boards were replaced by a bureaucratic system, generating a more hierarchic governmental order. The ministerial reform of 1840 sharply separated the jurisdictions of ministers and civil servants. Civil servants were placed outside the control of politicians, subsequently paving the way for a more delineated organizational competence.[44]

The most important normative structure in a differentiated society is the law, having the function of maintaining social order. Hence, because of the urgent need of the new states for a more nuanced law system, jurists were among the first professionals to became tied to the absolutist state. This was also the case for technical specialists. During the 18th century, *Ecole Polytechnique* was founded in France for satisfying especially military demands of engineers for the construction of weapons, bridges, mining, and also for the building of infrastructures like canals, roads, and so forth. In Sweden, *Bergskollegium* was established already in 1634, for the surveillance of mining. In 1750, a special *Bergsexamen* was introduced for engineers of this branch.

During the 17th century the art of medicine was divided into three branches - physicians (or doctors), surgeons, and apothecaries, where surgery was more of a craft. In 1663, efforts were made to organize medical education in Sweden by the introduction of *Collegicum medicum*, and in 1686, *Kirurgiska societeten* was founded. Medical professionals were not tied to the state in the same unabridged manner as lawyers and engineers, but due to their own initiatives they came to have a considerable impact on the cultural and political development of 18th century Sweden (e.g. Linné aus).

However, it is not until the nineteenth century, establishing their own societies and associations, that most classical professions achieve an identity of their own and an awareness of constituting a "profession - for - itself". Most classical professions were established as societies and associations during the nineteenth century. The Society of Physicians (Läkarsällskapet) was founded in 1807, The Association of Lawyers (Juridiska föreningen) in 1849, The Association of Technicians (Teknologföreningen) in 1861, The Swedish Association of Teachers (Lärarsällskapet) in 1894.[45] In addition, it is at the end of the 19th century, when Sweden is transformed from a liberal economy with weak links between industry and the state to more active cooperation (and competition) between private and public sectors, that we find the really significant thrusts forward for professional occupations.

If we want to capture the essence of this long historical period - from around the middle of the 16th to the beginning of the 19th century - in a few words, it may be characterized first by the emergence of nation states or "absolutist" states, i.e. new and larger territorial units. Subsequent rationalizations were needed in order to preserve and

sometimes enlarge these borders. Hence the state sought competence in several areas, not least effective taxation systems in order to keep an expensive war machine. Thus we can say that military officers constituted the key profession of this period. Together with the clergy and the emerging corps of professional civil servants, the military remained the predominant expert group in sustaining territorial and social order.

Technical Professions and the Industrial State

As mentioned, engineers were originally employed for military purposes, mining and so on. The industrial revolution, followed by numerous scientific and technical innovations during the nineteenth century, drastically altered the scene, generating highly increased demands of expertise and a well-educated labor force in industry. As Rolf Torstendahl points out, by the end of the 19th century there were two major reasons for the employment of technologists by the state. First, engineers were needed for the production and distribution of public services like rail roads, ship building, gas and electricity, sewer systems, street lights, telegraph, telephone, power stations, housing, and so on. Some of these areas were monopolized in the public interest. In addition, training of technical experts were increasingly managed by the state. Second, technical experts were employed by the state for the regulation and control of new technical systems and inventions introduced by private business. Safety was the main concern; rules were needed for the construction of ships, electricity and more, and only qualified experts were able to assess new technology and propose appropriate safety standards.[46] In other words, government employed a kind of *counter expertise* to meet and supervise the enthusiastic endeavors of private industry.

Thus, the engineering profession had its take-off at the end of the 19th century:

Swedish Engineers, 1850/54 - 1910/14[47]



In 1985, there were approximately 42.000 active civil engineers in Sweden, of which 26.000 were privately employed, 9.000 publicly employed and 7.000 self-employed. Together with architects and the vast groups of semi-professional technicians they numbered approx. 220.000.[48]

At the turn of the century, engineers often held high positions as presidents of private corporations, introducing the so well-discussed phenomenon of the professional manager, separating ownership from management and leadership. After the Second World War the leading positions of engineers was challenged and largely replaced by economists and other experts in commercial knowledge. As Torstendahl points out, *manipulative knowledge* - the matching of products with market preferences and vice versa - became of great importance, creating space for market psychologists and others in the private sector. Due to rapid shifts in production, social technology - the matching of men with machines - made its entry in the private sector.[49]

Human Service Professions and the Welfare State

But of course, social technology had its real break-through due to the rapid expansion of another sector; the origin of the so-called welfare state at the beginning of the 1930s (even though the welfare state can be traced further back in time, e.g. to Bismarck's social insurance system during the 19th century, or the law of age pension in Sweden of 1913). The political turning point in Sweden for solidaristic principles came with 1930's Depression and the formation of a parliamentary coalition between the Social Democratic and the Agricultural parties.[50] The end of the 30s signifies the initiation of "professionalization of reform", carried out under the uniquely long period of Social democratic governmental rule. The jewel in the crown of Swedish welfare was the instigation of an active labor market policy under the auspices of The Labor Market Board, AMS (1948), principally designed by two economic experts, Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner.[51] In general terms, an increasingly interventionist policy of the state, assuming responsibility for a host of general interests, turns the ties between government and various kinds of expert groups into a natural unification. The hallmark of the welfare state is its guarantee of a set of civil rights such as minimal standards of income, health, education, housing. This politics happens to be in perfect agreement with the interests of the administrative, medical, educational, and social work professions; the expansion of social rights "can be argued in terms of social justice for every citizen rather than the self-interest of every profession."[52] Thus, welfare politics provides a very fruitful soil for the augmentation of new types of "people-treating" professions.

Sweden is unique in this respect, i.e. the links between government and the welfare professions are very strong. Close cooperation between higher welfare state politicians and professionals of medicine and social science during the 30s constitutes the beginning of this phase, involving the Stockholm School of Economics, prominent names such as Gunnar and Alva Myrdal, Gustav Möller, Ernst Wigforss and others. The idea of a "People's home" rests on a scientific base; it is a matter of teaching people how to live properly, how to raise and educate children according to scientific principles, how to build houses and cities according to rational standards.

There are differing opinions as to the time of origin of welfare, in Sweden and elsewhere. Of course the answer is contingent upon the preferred definition of welfare (marginal or universal rights? etc). Indeed, for the case of Sweden, 1930, 1945 and even 1970 has been suggested.[53] From the point of view of welfare state professionals,

however, the general take-off can be localized to the immediate post-war period, as witnessed by the increase in higher, professional education. There were 3000 in higher education in 1900, 10000 in 1929, and only 11000 in 1939, 15000 in 1949, 32000 in 1959 and a remarkable 114000 in 1969.[54]

Cooperation between politicians and human service organizations should not be exclusively considered as experts are "called upon" by politicians to take care of already given problems. Rather, it is a dialectic; welfare experts are very active in identifying problems and proposing measures and reform packages. Indeed, the typical welfare state professional may be conceived by commencing from a basic distinction between the normal and the deviant. It is only from a prior identification of standards for what should be regarded as health, normal behavior, minimum of existence, proper upbringing, justice and so on that illness, deviant behavior, poverty, blameworthy primary socialization and injustice can be observed and corrected. Thus the activities of welfare state professionals always presuppose a distinction between the rational and the irrational, the normal and the abnormal. Therefore, as a summary concept for the nature of these professions I would suggest that they constitute *the arbiters of normality*. The specialist competence of these professions reside in their ability and authority to identify the good and proper way of living, to guide the citizens to internalize appropriate norms, and thereby also to point out social malfunctions. Michel Foucault describes the nature of these functions in the following drastic manner:

> "The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the 'social worker'-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his body, his gestures, his behavior, his aptitudes, his achievements."[55]

The heavy areas in welfare are education, health care and social administration. Thus typical welfare professionals are the teacher, the physician and the social administrator/bureaucrat, together with broad assistant semi-professional groups of nurses, nursery assistants, social workers, and administrative personnel of various kinds. These occupations constitute the back-bone of welfare society. As mentioned, the counterparts on the private side are engineers and market-professionals such as economists, advertisers, and psychologists, together with associated semi-professional auxiliaries, the broad groups of technicians and clerks at lower levels.

If the engineer represents the professionalization of the private sector, we can let the university teacher and the physician represent the professionalization of welfare. As mentioned, scientifically based university education is the source from which the professions emanate. During our century the corps of physicians has been the most successful profession in terms of power as well as culture; its "paradigm" has dominated other professions as well as social thinking at large.

Physicians and University Teachers, 1860 - 1990[56]



The growth of university lecturers is a prerequisite for mass education, initiated during the 60s. The medical profession has its take-off between 1940 and 1950, as evident by changes between the ten-year intervals. Between these years the growth is 53%, between 1950 and 1960 the relational number is 45%, between 1960 and 1970 35%. The "boom" during the 70s implies an increase by 65%. Thereafter the rate of growth declines; during the 80s it is 38%, and during the 90s the rate of growth is estimated to be 21.5% (see graph below). In 1900 there were 22 physicians per 100.000 inhabitants, 1965 69 physicians, and 1985 there were 258 physicians per 100.000 inhabitants. In 1985, there were 21.600 active physicians, of which 18.600 publicly employed and 1.000 in private practice.

"Welfare state professionals" assume higher and lower positions in public hierarchies. The current trend is that in comparative terms, public service occupations become more low-paid and increasingly operated by women. These hierarchies are found in administration, the various welfare sectors, and also, in another form within the private sectors. Let us illustrate with health care.

Health Care. Employed 1985[57]



The graph reflects the relation between professionals, semi-professionals and assistants, as well as gender divisions in and between these groups. This pattern is generally found in most sectors, with the exception of technicians, where men dominate in each stratum. The fairly small amount of physicians indicates that this profession (like most higher professions) has succeeded relatively well in maintaining its exclusionary closure, i.e. prevent over-crowding.

Finally, it is interesting to have a look at the future of the professions, as estimated by the prognoses of Statistics Sweden.

Prognosis, Selected Professions[58]

	1985	1995	2005	2025
Technician	46000	57000	66000	71000
Market	29000	36000	41000	45000
Physician	21100	25000	28000	29000
Univ teach	15900	16000	17000	17000

The groups are "Higher technicians", "Marketers, brokers, representatives", "Physicians", and "University teachers". The prognosis rather accurately reflects current tendencies to cuts in the public sector and increasing expansion of market professionals. The prognosis also seems to support the so-called "maturity thesis", i.e. the notion that welfare regimes

reach a critical point, a ceiling.[59] Indeed, in Sweden at the turn of the 1970s the generally rising trend in welfare expenditure came to a halt, why the 80s should be characterized by stagnation (though not yet decline).[60]

Professionalization of Politics and the Corporatist State

In recent decades, approximately between 1970 and 1990, it seems possible to discern the rise of yet another professional or professional-like occupation; what I will call the political profession. This profession is also linked to gradual transformations of the tasks and general character of the state apparatus. Several preconditions for the emergence of a political profession can be identified, and I will touch upon two. First, the state (including communes and county councils), by taking on ever more and increasingly complex responsibilities - not least the management of the welfare sectors - has developed very broad administrative systems of regulation and steering. Second, initiated during thte 30s, forms of government have gradually undergone profound changes on national as well as regional and local levels, turning to *corporate* systems. These alterations have created a new political-administrative area of competence as well as yet another professional career opportunity.

The question of whether it is feasible to talk about an independent political profession is of course contingent upon the definition of profession adhered to. Employing the definition suggested above, my claim would be that politicians are carriers of a generally recognized, abstract system of expertise. Although I do not want to pursue this notion too far -there are other, non-professional attributes characterizing politicians - I nevertheless want to claim that between 1970 and 1990, a clear professionalization of politics has taken place. In the following, I will substantiate this claim by highlighting some of the more salient features of this process.

Since the claim that it is possible to discern a political profession is likely to arouse opposition, it might be better to begin this section with mentioning some conceivable counter-arguments.

1. Politicians constitute no profession since in a democracy, anyone can become a top politician.

2. There is no formal education to become a politician.

3. The political stratum is not autonomous or self-regulating; it does not control entry to its domains.

4. There is no particular, delineated political knowledge.

In the following I will try to show that these arguments do not hold water, i.e. it will be argued that there are tendencies to gate-keeping around political circles obstructing entry; that long socialization or "education" is a very common, if not imperative, precondition to become a modern politician; that there are internal mechanisms regulating entry; and that there exists a particular kind of esoteric, political knowledge and skill.

However, admittedly it is not easy to formulate a simple and reasonably precise delineation of "the political profession", so let me try to encircle it by suggesting some indications. At the individual level the concept denotes, and here I follow Max Weber, a person who devotes his life to politics and has it as his main source of income - let us say a person that obtains at least half of his earnings from political missions. A political professional does not have politics as a hobby.

At the parliamentary level, professionalism is indicated by e.g. the composition of the national and communal parliaments. If previously, conservative and liberal parties were represented by aristocrats, business leaders and various professionals such as lawyers and doctors, and socialist parties were mainly represented by people with a working class background and occasional left intellectuals, contemporary mass parties, irrespective of party color, are most often represented by individuals from the middle classes. Today, political representatives are mostly civil servants from the middle class, that is, people having a comparatively high education, working in sectors that have expanded with the growth of state interventionism. Politics has turned into a career ladder for parts of the middle class.[61]

In Sweden in 1988, 43% of members of parliament were publicly employed, 29% full-time politicians, ombudsmen and employed by social movements, 10% employers and only 13% privately employed. Compared to the 1985 election, the two first groups tended to increase at the expense of the two latter, in all parties except the liberal party (Folkpartiet), where the private sector increased slightly.[62] The most noteworthy is that employers and publicly employed are over-represented at the expense of privately employed. The working class is represented by the middle layers of the public sector.

A study of the Social Democratic Party in 1986 shows that its party elite stems from the public sector. The public sector together with the governmental office, the party itself, adjacent social movement organizations and the labor union (LO) makes up no less than 77 percent of the appointments. Thus, this internal recruitment comes from a surrounding network of organizations and authorities. To some extent it seems to be governed by personal ties, marriages, kinship.[63]

Modern politics constitutes a particular career pattern involving specific "educational lines" and safety systems. A contemporary Swedish politician has most often gone through a long process of socialization, starting with political school associations (and parents), thereafter political youth associations, student corporations, summer schools, local political work, courses and so forth - a series of refinements, preparations and contacts generating the group from which top politicians are later recruited. Increasingly, the political profession has obtained a relative autonomy, often carrying across party lines. Autonomy is based upon a specific discourse, specific kinds of knowledge, a specific political *habitus*, entrance barriers, specific systems of reward and loyalty, together with an increasingly refined safety and insurance system involving various fringe benefits, special retirement advantages, ambassadorial posts, county governor posts, and so on, to those who due to age or other reasons are forced to leave the political game. In this sense, the political profession is sheltered by a social closure of the classical kind.

A further indication of the occurrence of a political profession can perhaps be found in the latest two national elections, in which the established parties joined forces to turn against the risk of layman interference, i e. the threat of inexperienced parties entering parliament. A mutual interest surfaced, clearly overshadowing ordinary political tensions. *Populism* is a threat to the political profession, just as quackery has always constituted a major threat to the medical profession. Against the populist principle we can thus put the professional meritocratic principle.

In more general terms, this example illustrates the phenomenon of barriers of entry to, or closures of, political establishments. While studies of the U.S. indicate that there are more significant alliances among incumbents of different parties than between incumbents and non-incumbents of the same party, studies of multiparty systems similarly

show that parties in power tend to increase structural barriers to enhance their interests when they perceive a threat to their own power.[64]

Professionalization of politics is further indicated by attempts to establish it upon a specific, scientific knowledge base. In recent decades, several new disciplines have been advanced, called "policy science", "policy analysis", "market research" and the like. These subjects, designed to serve the management of the public sector, correspond to "business administration", "organizational psychology", and other subjects originally fashioned to serve the governance of private business. In both cases, scientific rationality is introduced for the more professional and technocratic management of politics and economy.[65]

This "discursive coalition"[66] between the (social) sciences and politics produced a number of well-known effects, including an increasingly impersonal and instrumental conception of public action. Science and technology has introduced new modes of accountability and legitimation into the political realm, and also imputed new values and moral ideals into the modern political habitus. As Yaron Ezrahi notes: "The virtues of the dispassionate expert have come to be at least partially generalizable as the ideal virtues of political actors."[67]

Modern mass parties are organizations. As such they should not be reduced to their own ideology or official goals. Parties are not simple reflections of social divisions or external needs or demands. Therefore, expressions like "workers' parties, "bourgeois parties" and so on are sometimes somewhat misleading. Rather, as recent organizational theory has shown, after initiation organizations develop into self-perpetuating systems within which a number of goals may be pursued and realized. Hence, organizations are characterized by a certain autonomy and inertia in relation to their official goals. Inside a party, hierarchies, factional strategies and internal markets develop that must be taken into consideration for understanding the manifestations of politics and politicians, in the same sense that corporate behavior cannot be accounted for by being reduced to the aim of profit.

An alternative approach to the political profession is therefore to examine the relation between its material base - especially the state apparatus and its ramifications into the welfare sectors - and other social groups and institutions. If Theda Skocpol and other adherents of the "state autonomy thesis" are correct, higher politicians and state officials enjoy a clear independence in relation to the interests they represent and are accountable to. In other words, it is not the case that state officials are direct reflections of social interests, be these general or sectorial. On the contrary, Skocpol argues that "one feature of all autonomous state actions will be the reinforcement of the prerogatives of collectives of state officials".[68] On the other hand, Walter Korpi advocates caution in this context, contending from the point of view of his own "power resource perspective" that "due to state officials' weak control over basic power resources (capital and votes), their autonomy and freedom of choice is sharply reduced"[69] Degrees of autonomy turns into an empirical issue, contingent upon weak or strong states.[70]

While the service professions are associated with the evolution of the welfare state, the nature of contemporary politics is strongly linked to, and has as its presupposition, the expansion of the *corporatist state*, i.e. the form of government that emerged at the beginning of the 1970s, where public authorities, industrial organizations, and labor unions negotiate the goals of social development.[71] The concept of corporatism connotes an ordering of society which cuts across the structures of class and parliamentary democracy. The economic side of corporatism implies that a large part of resource allocation, such as salaries, prices and profits, are regulated by informal

bargaining between state representatives, employer's representatives, and trade union leaders, outside the channels of parliamentary democracy. Politically, corporatism implies negotiations between separate interests based upon a mutual agreement to achieve consensus concerning actions and future targets.

The key concept for this type of negotiating profession is, I would suggest, *representative competence*. A political professional represents a particular interest. It may concern the youths or the retired or the handicapped, the environment, the seals, the car owners, the tenants or particular occupational groups, or broader public and private interests. With the concept "representative competence" I imply a certain neutrality and distance to the represented interest (which means that some spokesmen of new social movements must be excluded - rather they are "organic intellectuals", in Gramsci's sense). As mentioned, what distinguishes a political-administrative competence is a certain know-how; knowledge of the most significant arguments pro and contra concerning specific political issues and how the arguments should be presented, i.e. insights into the relevant discourse, together with a certain political *habitus*.

This type of profession can be illustrated in several ways. Here are some well-known examples. The chief representative of, let us say, The Association of Tenants, can one day walk over to the other side of the table and proceed to represent the interests of the Association of Landlords. An economist and party professional like a minister of finance for the Labor party can resign and become member of the boards of various capitalist corporations. A former party leader can become a representative for virtually any socially organized interest, such as e.g. the Association of Pensioners. That political competence is not primarily linked to or concerned with knowledge of a specific subject matter is also demonstrated by the ease with which ministers of government swap chairs; a minister may change departments several times during his career. In this respect, ministers are "exchangeable" in the Durkheimian sense. Just like the piano player can move from one piano to the next, and the physician from one patient to the next, so the minister can move from one department to the next. More seriously, from the point of view of knowledge, the phenomenon of chair swapping among politicians leaves us with two possibilities; either no special knowledge is required, or else there exists another kind of knowledge, a special political qualification that may be called expertise in "political technology", or "representative competence".

According to Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter, in corporatist society we can discern a fourth independent system of order besides the commonly recognized spheres of community, market and state. In this fourth sphere, contrary interests meet and bargain under ordered forms; the guiding principle is "organizational concertation".[72] This peaceful system of resolution constitutes the institutional and material basis of a large part of what I call preconditions for the professionalization of politics, not least because it implies an enlarged distance between representatives and represented (modern representation is acting for interests, rather than standing in place of, mirroring, or substituting for other persons). To the professional representative, the persons represented are clients, and his negotiating counterparts are colleagues.

A frequently discussed problem concerning the delineation of the political profession is the relation between elected politicians and higher governmental and communal bureaucrats. For Weber there existed a clear watershed between these two jurisdictions; while the politician stands for visions and policy making, the bureaucrat stands for administration and implementation. However, in several respects international comparative political research now questions the relevance of this distinction, claiming

that currently we witness a "bureaucratization of politics and a politization of bureaucracy" in regards to appointment as well as function. The typical political professional is characterized as a "*pure hybrid*" of politics and administration, in the U.S. as well as in Europe.[73] Thus Hugh Heclo writes about the U.S. that "the major point is that somewhere in this smudgy zone between top presidential appointees and the several thousand officials below them the vital interface of political administration occurs"[74], while Mayntz and Scharpf claim about West Germany that the modern political professional "must be able to speak the language of the politician as well as of the bureaucrat, they must be men of two worlds as it were".[75]

To this complex political-administrative role set is often added specialists, experts of particular subjects. In order to be politically useful, a technical expert must also possess political awareness. He must "develop a greater political consciousness, greater sophistication, and less innocence." This is one reason why, according to March and Olsen, a "sharp division of labor between specialists and policy makers is impossible to sustain, either conceptually or behaviourally".[76] Taken together, these groups - political leaders, top administrators and experts - tend to produce "discourse coalitions" for the formulation and advancement of policy strategies.[77]

However, I am far from positive that those radical proposals for conceptual amalgamation are well-founded; rather, they seem to be extrapolations of recent trends, often with a clear "cynical" bent. To my mind, the chief problem is that within the political-administrative sector, there are two kinds of competence, one representative (legitimating) and one administrative (implementing), and the question is how inextricably interwoven these actually are. (Changes in systems of law or governance, such as the Swedish commune reforms, in one blow alters relations of power and jurisdiction between politicians and administrators, see below.)

Nevertheless, if we for the moment follow the trajectories of contemporary research, it would imply that the political profession comprises the top layers of political parties, state and communal bureaucracy, adjacent organizations such as labor unions, and also more frequently employed scientific and technical advisors. Representatives and negotiators (including "lobbyists") from the private sectors should also be included. As a summary concept for these groups I suggest that they constitute the *administrators of rationality*. Their specialist competence fundamentally involves political administration, aimed at uniting political ideas and programs with social technology, i.e. to link ideas like equality and safety with distribution programs and implementation techniques; combinations of legitimity (representation) and effectivity (administration).

"Professionalization of reform" is evidenced by the high levels of education of Swedish top civil servants. A study of the 1200 top bureaucrats in central government shows that virtually all have a basic university degree, almost one out of five has a research degree, and four out of ten report personal experiences of doing research.[78]

In the political-administrative sector as well as in other sectors, we find typical professional hierarchies. At the top we have the political and administrative elites, below what may be called semi-professional politicians of communal boards and the like, and below these the farthest ramifications of the administration of rationality, e.g. social secretaries. Hence the question arises how to operationalize this profession.[79]

For this and other well-known reasons, attempts to empirically illustrate the development of a Swedish political-administrative profession by official statistics quickly leads to severe theoretical and operational problems. Jan-Erik Lane, Sven Arvidson and Tage Magnuson has undertaken a commendable attempt to chart *administration*. They

find that within the Swedish governmental sector the central authorities, preoccupied with general administrative tasks, "experienced something of a golden age during the 70s"[80] Civil administration, concerned with control, planning, budgeting, and the like has increased compared to regional and local administrations, i.e. the field for more substantial operative activities. In central administration, between 1954 and 1982 the number of employees increased from 12.000 to 60.000, or by 394 percent, while local authorities increased by 175 per cent. Among administrative personnel, higher officials ("byråsekreterare" and higher) increased considerably, from half a per cent in 1954 to 7 per cent in 1982. The authors conclude that administrative functions have expanded more than operative, and that higher officials have increased more than lower.

The county councils show the same tendency. While the total number employed increased by 287 percent between 1965 and 1984, the number of employees at central administration increased by 319 percent. This tendency can be further illustrated by comparing the growth of physicians and administrative personnel in counties:

Physicians and Administrators in Counties, 1965 - 1985[81]

	1965	1973	1979	1985
Physicians	3357	6371	11345	16112
Administr	4346	15820	24426	31577

While administrative personnel have grown by 627%, physicians have grown by 380%.

Finally, Lane/Arvidson/Magnuson shows that the same tendency prevails in the communes. The costs per inhabitant for administration has increased from 101 Swedish crowns in 1954 to 1325 in 1984, in the 1984 currency, or with 1.311 percent. During the same period, the total costs for all communal expenses has increased with 15.490 crowns, or 418 percent.

The communal mergers of 1952 and 1962-74 (from 2498 communes and towns 1951 to 284 primary communes 1984) produced a drastic decrease in numbers of elected politicians, from approx. 200.000 prior to 1952 to approx. 50.000 in 1974, followed by yet an increase to approx. 70.000 in 1980. Since simultaneously, the number of tasks have increased, the reduction of politicians implied a correspondent drastic increase in the number of political administrators and other civil servants. The larger communes has a relational figure of 10 to 1 between full-time political administrators and full-time politicians[82], implying a professionalization of politics. These organizational transformations together with decentralization and delegation of decisions, frame laws and frame budgets imply a correspondent politization of the activities of civil servants.[83]

To sum up this section: the notion of a contemporary political profession rests on the emergence of a corporative governmental form. It involves two kinds of competence, organizational skill and representative expertise. While the first is necessitated by swelling governmental responsibilities and objectives, as manifested by the differentiation of public bureaucracy, the second is the product of representative democracy in its recent forms. In the two last decades, this profession has increasingly been circumvented by exclusionary closure. As a rule, those who aspire to top positions have been required to go through long processes of socialization and apprenticeship, designed by large party organizations. The resulting political knowledge resides in the ability to represent and make choices, and internalization of the *habitus* proper for civilized interest negotiations.

Let me conclude this section with a few additional words about the notion of a political profession. To my mind, there is no doubt that the political stratum has indeed acquired a number of typically professional attributes, one major structural precondition for which has been the emergence of a corporative system of political government. In Sweden, political professionalization has been closely tied to the long governmental period of Social Democracy. However, since several attributes are not institutionalized or legally sanctioned they should perhaps be viewed as conjectural, confined to the period 1970 - 1990, with a peak around 1980.

Moreover, the shift to the 90s may be the beginning of a new phase. Decentralization, neo-conservative advances, the dismantling of the public sector, the reintroduction of a market economy, populist movements, critique of corporatism, and other factors, not least the erosion of plan economies all over the world, seem to imply a reduction of corporative capitalism[84] together with a deprofessionalization of politics and governmental incumbency. Indeed, Thorsten Nybom argues that one main reason for the contemporary setback of the public sector has been a recent gradually diminishing competence within Swedish state agencies, engendered by the massive introduction of "undergraduate-bureaucracies", chiefly populated by "progressive and engaged" social scientists and social workers who have constituted themselves as both scientific and practical "experts".[85]

So perhaps in retrospect, the 90s will signify the rise of a new phase of capitalism, another mode of state- market- and society formation, engendering new types of professions. To end with a speculation: If we say that market forces and market professionals have, at least temporarily, conquered the public sector - as witnessed by e.g. the victory of the rightist parties in the Swedish 1991 election - and hence that for political reasons, the market is not likely to be counter-balanced by a strong public sphere, perhaps we can expect a reaction in the form of a rise in demands for a new type of expertise for the defence of weaker social strata, e.g. the take-off of professions articulating and organizing consumers' interests, patients' interests, and so forth.

Conclusion

After a definition of the concept of profession and an attempt to localize professions in a broader context of class, stratification, and tensions between private and public spheres, four historical "take-offs" for specific kinds of professionals were identified; civil servants and state administrators, engineers, social service professionals, and political professionals. The take-offs were linked to changes in one crucial determinant; variations in governmental forms and state policies. The result lends some credence to the thesis that in Continental social formations, the demands and needs of the state is a major precondition for professional evolution. Of course there are additional conditions that are essential for the origins and growth of professions, such as technological development, cultural environment, and not the least, the activities and strategies of professional organizations. Above, by focussing upon one element of a more comprehensive model that would ultimately include several determinants, I have attempted to demonstrate the viability of a broad sociological approach to the professions.

Notes

1. Abbot, Andrew, *The System of Professions*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988, p. 1.

2. Gouldner, Alvin, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*. London: The Macmillan Press, 1979.

3. Freidson, Eliot, in Dingwall and Lewis (eds), *The Sociology of Professions*. London: MacMillan, p. 20.

4. Ibid., p 11.

5. Ibid., p 38.

6. Geison, Gerald, "Introduction", in Geison, G (ed), *Professions and Professional Ideologies in America*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1983, p 6.

7. Ibid., p 184, 182.

8. Ibid., p 12.

9. Ibid., p 55.

10. A first difficulty in outlining the general structural parameters of professions is that the conditions of professionals are quite distinct in various countries. A major difference if found between Anglo-American and Continental countries. In the Anglo-American context, the professional model or ideal-type is based on the notion of the self-employed practitioner, organizing into collegiate affiliations that control recruitment, training, credentialling and licensing. The Continental ideal-type, on the other hand, is closely linked to the activity of the state. Professionals are trained and credentialized by higher learning institutions of the state, especially the universities, and will to a great extent be employed by or work for state agencies. This leads us to expect that two quite dissimilar "professional profiles" will emerge in Anglo-American and Continental context, see below.

11. Cf for example Millerson, G, *The Qualifying Association*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964.

12. Brante, Thomas, "Sociological Approaches to the Professions", *Acta Sociologica*, Vol.31, No. 2, 1988.

13. Parsons, Talcott, *Essays in Sociological Theory*. New York: The Free Press, 1964, p. 98.

14. Perkin, Harold, *Key Profession*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969.

15. Freidson, Eliot, *Professional Powers*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1976, p. 59.

16. Larson, Magali, "In the matter of experts and professionals, or how impossible it is to leave nothing unsaid", in Torstendahl, R, Burrage, M (eds), *The Formation of Professions*. London: SAGE, 1990, p. 30.

17. See Brante, Thomas, Professional Types as a Strategy of Analysis",in Burrage, M., Torstendahl, R. (eds), *Professions in Theory and History*. London: SAGE, 1990.

18. Torstendahl, Rolf, "Essential properties, strategic aims and historical development: three approaches to theories of professionalism". In Burrage, M., Torstendahl, R. (eds), *Professions in Theory and history*. London: SAGE, 1990, pp 53.

19. Abbot, Andrew, op. cit., p 7-8.

20. Hellberg, Inga, *Studier i professionell organisation*. Doctoral dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Gothenburg, 1978.

21. Giddens, Anthony, *The Conception of Modernity*. Oxford: Polity Press, 1990.

22. For example, Peter Flora, in his comparative statistics, has chosen to omit occupational statistics altogether. He writes: "The classification by occupation has been excluded since it poses insurmountable problems of comparability, even for the period after World War II." Flora, Peter, *State, Economy and Society in Western Europe 1815 - 1975, Vol. I.* Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag.

23. Therborn, Göran, *Klasstrukturen i Sverige 1930 - 80*. Lund: Zenit förlag.

24. In Erik Wright's quite different class schedule, the basic distribution of people in the class structure of Sweden and the U.S. is remarkably similar. The middle classes constitute 54.6 percent of the U.S. and 54.4 percent of the Swedish labor force. Within this class, the category of "expert" is distinguished by the criterion "assets in credentials". Wright includes all professionals, technicians and managers (by occupational title) with college degrees. While Swedish expertise constitutes 15 percent of the labor force, the U.S. experts are 11 percent. Associated "semi-credentialed" experts are 25 percent and 25.2 percent respectively. Wright, Erik, *Classes*. London: Verso Press, 1985.

25. Ehrenreich, B, and Ehrenreich, J, The Professional-Managerial Class". In Walker, J. (ed), *Between Labor and Capital*. New York: Monthly Review, 1979.

26. Wright, op. cit., pp 86.

27. Bourdieu, Pierre, *Distinction. A social critique of the judgement of taste*. London: Routledge, 1989, part III.

28. Wright, Eric, op. cit., p. 73-96; Western, Mark, "Class Structure and Intergenerational Mobility: A Comparative Analysis". Paper presented at the VIIth International Conference of the Comparative Project on Class Structure and Class Consciousness, Granada, July, 1991.

29. *Sources: ILO, Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1989-90*, Table 3 B, and Taylor, C, Jodice, D, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Vol 1, 1983.*

30. Goldthorpe, John, *Social Mobility and Class Structure in Britain*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.

31. Lash, S, and Urry, J, *The End of Organized Capitalism*. London: Polity Press, 1987, p 162.

32. Skocpol, Theda, "Bringing the State Back In". In Evans, P, Ruschemeyer, D, Skocpol, T (eds), *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

33. Rose, Richard, "The Significance of Public Employment". In Rose, Richard (ed), *Public Employment in Western Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, table 1.3.

34. Perkin, Harold, *The Rise of Professional Society*. London: Routledge, 1989, p 9 - 10.

35. This assertion can of course be discussed. While the inherent contradictions of feudalism and capitalism are of an objective nature, as demonstrated by Marx, the contradiction between public and private does not have this character. Indeed, it might be argued that since private industry is subsidized by the state, everything is public, the borders artificial. On the other hand, it may also be argued that public employees are dependent upon the private sector, since taxes generated from the private sector pays the salaries of most public employees. Simultaneously, though, obviously there is a profound political struggle entailing crucial consequences going on between the sectors.

36. These figures are calculated from the new socio-economic categorization that Statistics Sweden began to use in 1985. Higher professionals and managers in my estimation equals "higher civil servants/leading post". In this category is included occupations normally requiring at least six years education after high-school. To this category, I have added "free practitioners/academic occupations", i.e. self-employed with the same educational requirements. Typical occupations are lawyers, higher civil servants (byrådirektör), civil engineers, university teachers, physicians, planning directors, psychologists, administrative directors, members of parliament, managers in private and public sectors, higher officers, and more. The semi-professionals equals "occupations on a middle level", i.e. occupations normally requiring three but not six years of education after high-school. Typical occupations are middle level civil servants (byråsekreterare), journalist, class teacher, police inspector, nurses, social worker, engineer, middle level officer. For further details see *Meddelanden i samordningsfrågor, Socioekonomisk indelning*, SCB.

37. Calculated from data files, Statistics Sweden.

38. Olofson, Gunnar, "Den stränge fadern och den goda modern - sociologiska perspektiv på den moderna svenska staten". In Himmelstrand, U., Svensson, G, (eds), *Sverige - vardag och struktur*. Stockholm: Norstedts, 1988.

39. Torstendahl, Rolf, "Technology and Development of society, 1850 - 1980. Four Phases of Industrial Capitalism in Western Europe". *History and Technology*, No. 1, 1984.

40. Gaunt, David, *Utbildning till statens tjänst*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1975, p. 86.

41. Ibid.

42. Forsén, Anders, "Nya roller, nya krav. Några drag i den svenska nationalstatens formering". *Historisk tidskrift*, No. 4, 1987. It should be noted that it took a very long time before the new intentions were realized.

43. Ibid.

44. Torstendahl, Rolf, *Bureaucratization in Northwestern Europe, 1880 - 1985*. London: Routledge, 1991, Esp. ch. 9.

45. Åmark, Claes, Open cartels and social closures: professional strategies in Sweden, 1860 - 1950. In Burrage, M, Torstendahl, R (eds), op. cit, pp 112.

46. Torstendahl, op cit, 1991.

47. *Source*: Ahlström Göran, Engineers and Industrial Growth. London: Croom Helm, 1982, p. 38. Employing partly different sources, Rolf Torstendahl concludes that "From the latter part of the 19th century to the outbreak of the Second World War tens of thousands of technicians were invading Swedish society". Torstendahl, Rolf, *Dispersion of Engineers in a Transitional Society*. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1975, p. 37.

48. Calculated by the Swedish Association of Civil Engineers.

49. Torstendahl, 1991, pp 16.

50. Esping-Andersen, Gösta, and Korpi, Walter, *From Poor Relief to Welfare States: The Development of Scandinavian Social Policy*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for Social Research, 1987.

51. Rothstein, Bo. *Den socialdemokratiska staten. Reformer och förvaltning inom svensk arbetsmarknads- och skolpolitik*. Lund: Arkiv förlag, 1986.

52. Perkin, op cit 1989, p 14.

53. For a detailed study of the various meanings of welfare, see Esping-Andersen, Gösta, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. London: Polity Press, 1990.

54. Flora, Peter, op cit, p 616.

55. Foucault, Michel, *Discipline and Punish*. New York: Vintage, 1979, p. 304.

56. Source: *Population and Housing Census 1985*. Statistics Sweden (SCB), 1989.

57. Source: *Population and Housing Census 1985*. Statistics Sweden (SCB), 1989.

58. Source: *Trender och prognoser*. Statistics Sweden (SCB), 1990.

59. For a discussion of the maturity thesis see e.g. Mishra, Ramesh, *The Welfare State in Capitalist Society*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990, pp 106.

60. Ohlson, Sven E., *Social Policy and Welfare State in Sweden*. Lund: Arkiv förlag, 1990, p 255.

61. In 1937, 5.3% of the first chamber of parliament had a working-class background, and 13.0% of the second chamber. In 1961, the rate of working-class background had decreased to 2.0% in the first chamber, and 4.3% in the second chamber. Sköld, Lars, Halvarson, Arne, "Riksdagens sammansättning under hundra år". *Samhälle och riksdag, Vol. I.* Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1966, p 481.

62. Engnér, Eskil, *Politikers yrken*. Industriförbundet, 1989.

63. Isaksson, Anders, "Rörelsen - en jättekoncern för partitrogna". *Veckans affärer*, No. 48, 1986.

64. See e.g. Holcombe, Randall, "Barriers to Entry and Political Competition", or Doron, Gideon, and Maor, Moshe, "Barriers to Entry into a Political System", both in *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 3(2), 1991.

65. Fischer, Frank, *Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise*. Newbury Park: SAGE, 1990, spec. Ch. 6.

66. Wagner, Peter, and Wittrock, Björn, "States, Institutions and Discourses". In Wagner, P., Wittrock, B., and Whitley, R. (eds), *Discourses on Society*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.

67. Ezrahi, Yarn, *The Descent of Icarus*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1990, p 52.

68. Skocpol, Theda, op cit, p 15.

69. Korpi, Walter, "Makt, politik och statsautonomi i det sociala medborgarskapets framväxt. En jämförande studie av 18 OECD-länder." *Sociologisk forskning*, No. 4, 1988, p 10.

70. Korpi (ibid.) examines the question empirically on the basis of OECD data, and finds that state officials do not tend to increase their social insurance benefits, indicating that autonomy or self-interest is not realized or sought in this case. However, it is uncertain whether the development of social insurance is a good indicator of autonomy, which Korpi also notes.

71. For a discussion of the concept and an application on Sweden, see e.g. Ruin, Olof, "Korporatismen och demokratin i det moderna samhället", i *Nykorporatismen*. Stockholm: Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, 1983. For a discussion of the various meanings of the concept, and of the economic and political effects of corporatism, see Therborn, Göran, "Does Corporatism Really Matter?" *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol 17, No. 3, 1986.

72. Streeck, Wolfgang, Schmitter, Philippe, "Community, market, state - and associations?" *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1985.

73. Aberbach, J, Putnam, R, Rockman, B, *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981, p 19.

74. Ibid., p 19.

75. Ibid., p 18.

76. March, J, Olsen, J., *Rediscovering Institutions*. New York: The Free Press, 1989, p 30-1.

77. Wagner, Peter, and Wittrock, Björn, "Discourse Coalitions and State Developments." Paper.

78. Premfors, Rune, "Scientific Bureaucracy"? In Trow, Martin, Nybom, Thorsten (eds), *University and Society*, London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1991.

79. In 1980, 73% of the publicly employed were subject to politically elected officials (1950 65%), which is a high figure in Europe but is exceeded by the U.S., with its tradition of preferring elected officials instead of experts (92% in 1980). Rose, R., *op cit*, p 28.

80. Lane, J-E, Arvidson, S, Magnuson, T, op cit, p 79.

81. Source: Lane, J-E, Arvidson, S, Magnuson, T., op cit.

82. Strömberg, Lars, "Kommunförvaltningen", i Strömberg, L, Westerståhl, J (eds), *De nya kommunerna*. Stockholm: Liber förlag, 1983, p 176.

83. See e.g. Gustavsson, Agne, *Kommun och landsting idag*. Malmö: Liber förlag, 1988.

84. Leif Lewin argues that during the 80s, at the national but not regional level Sweden has witnessed a decrease of corporatism. To my mind, however, available figures are far from unequivocal on this issue. Lewin, Leif, *Samhället och de organiserade intressena*. Stockholm: Norstedts, 1992, pp. 100.

85. Nybom, Thorsten, "The Swedish Social Democratic State". Forthcoming in Due-Nielsen, C., Kirchhoff, K, Lammers, K. (eds), *Konflikt of Samarbejde*. Copenhagen, 1992.